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To reduce  price risk caused  by the instability  of primary  com-
modity  markets,  countries  that  depend  for export  earnings  on a
single  primary  commodity  can find substantial  long-run  protec-
tion  by rolling  over  one-period  futures.  The practical  benefits  of
a substantially  longer  hedging  horizon  may often  be small.
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Countries  that depend  on a single  primary  export  substantial  long-term  protection  is possible  by
for their foreign  earnings  are likely  to experience  rolling  over one-period  futures. The marginal
sharp  fluctuations  in export  earnings  and their  net benefits  of lengthening  the horizon  beyond
underlying  wealth,  because  of the instability  of  the one production  period  (roughly  observed  in
aft  primary  commodity  markets. As part of  practice)  depend  upon  transaction  costs, the
structural  adjustment,  several  countries  have  degree  of serial  correlation,  and the discount
liberalized  their trade regimes,  so domestic  factor. In practice,  the extra benefits  of a sub-
producers  are no longer  insulated  from intema-  stantially  longer  hedging  horizon  may often  be
tional  price fluctuations.  small.
Kletzer,  Newbery,  and Wright  review  the  * If production  responds  to incentives  with a
costs of export  price  instability  and consider  the  one-period  lag, the rollover  strategy  does not
role  of conventional  instruments  (loans,  price  provide  perfect protection  at the time the hedge
stabilization  measures,  future  contracts,  and  is made  - even if the production  response  to
futures  rollovers  for longer-term  price protec-  inputs  is nonstochastic,  as opposed  to the case of
tion),  as well  as instruments  loosely  called  one-period  hedging.
"'commodity  bonds." They  weigh the implica-
tions of the risk of borrower  default  when  the  * When  a sovereign  exporter  can offer no
borrower's  aim  is smoothing  consumption.  collateral  and is short  of liquid resources,  the use
They  conclude:  of futures  is precluded  by the need to fumish the
margins  that guard against  default. The disad-
* In principle,  consumption-smoothing  vantage  of standard  loans and buffer  funds  is that
contracts  might  be valuable  to countries  depen-  they  will probably  reach  crisis states  in which the
dent  on an export  commodity  subject  to price  resolution  of the crisis is ill-defined. The
risk. Futures  coverage  could  help if longer  lenders' recognition  of this will  dampen  their
maturities  were  available. They conclude  that  enthusiasm.
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This Is a revised  version  of a paper  presented  at the World  Bank,  Commodity
Economics  Division,  June 1990.SMOOTHING  THE CONSUMPTION  OF PRIMARY  COMMODITY  EXPORTERS:
AN ASSESSMENT  O3F  SOME ALTERNATIVE  INSTRUMENTS
by
Kenneth M. Kletzer, David M. Newbery, and Brian D.  Wright
The value  of  oil  in  Norway was estimated  at  71  percent  of  total
wealth  for  1980,  at  a  price  of  oil  of  $16.40  ($1980)  per  barrel.  At
various  times  since  1980 the  forecast  price  of  oil  has  been  twice  this
level  and  is  now  probably  half  this  estimate.  Given  that  Norwegian
oil  is  costly  to  extract,  the  effect  of  doubling  or  halving  the  price  of
oil  would  be  to  more  than  double  or  halve  the  value  of  oil  output,
indicating  that  fluctuations  in  the  price  of  oil  will  cause  wild  swings
in  Norway's  net  income,  and  permanent  price  shifts  will  have  a
profound  effect  on  the  estimated  value  of  Norway's  assets,  and  hence
on  her  estimated  sustainable  consumption  level.
Similar  calculations  could  be  performed  for  Mexico,  Nigeria,
Zambia,  the  OPEC  nations  and  a  range  of  other  countries  which
depend  on  a  single  primary  export  for  most  of  their  foreign  earnings.
Given  the  substantial  instability  in  all  primary  commodity  markets,
such  countries  are  likely  to  experience  sharp  fluctuations  in  export
earnings  and  their  underlying  wealth.  To  the  extent  that  these
fluctuations  will  affect  consumption  they  will  be  costly,  and  we
would  expect  the  countries  to  seek  ways  of  managing  these  risks  and
reducing  their  costs.
1As  part  of  the  package  of  structural  adjustments  several
countries  have  liberalized  their  trade  regimes,  with  the  consequence
that  domestic  pr,oucers  are  no  longer  insulated  from  international
price  fluctuations.  Indeed,  it  may  well  be  better  for  the  individual
producers  to  manage  their  risk  directly,  rather  than  the  government
intervenintg  to  stabilize  domestic  prices  and  absorbing  the  resulting
risk.  This  paper  does  not  inquire  into  this  important  issue,  and
instead  concentrates  on  the  management  of  country-level
consumption  risk,  and  considers  actions  which  the  government  might
undertake  to  reduce  the  cost  of  that  risk.  in  many  countries  the
nature  of  the  resource  endowment  and  its  comparative  advantage
rule  out  production  diversification  as  a  significant  near-term
strategy,  and  we  assume  it  away  here.  In  addition,  we  rule  out
diversification  via  exchange  of  equity  investments  with  foreigners.
The paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First  we  review  the  costs  of
export  price  instability,  with  some  reference  to  the  empirical
magnitudes.  Then  in  section  2  we  consider  the  role  of  conventional
instruments,  including  loans,  price  stabilization  measures,  and
futures  contracts.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  potential  use  of
futures  rollovers  for  longer-term  price  protection,  and  the  effect  of
production  response  on  that  protection.
The  above  instruments  encounter  difficulties  in  the  presence  of
sovereign  risk  and/or  capital  shortages.  In  section  3  we  discuss
instruments  that  are  come  under  the  loose  heading  "commodity
bonds,"  and  consider  the  implications  of  borrower  default  risk  in  the
presence  of  a  consumption-smoothing  motivation  on  the  part  of  the
borrower.  (In  this  paper  the  lenders  are  assumed  always  to  honor
2their  contracts.)  Dynamic  consumption  smoothing  paths,  with  and
without  a  borrower  default  constraint,  are  addressed  in  section  4,
using  the  constrained  optimal  fully  state  contingent  contract  as  a
benchmark.  Conclusions follow  in  section  5.
1.  The  Costs  of  Income  Variability
Consider  a  country  that  has  economically  unresponsive
production  ("zero  supply  elasticity')  and  seeks  to  maximize  the
expected  utility  of  its  representative  consumer
(1)  V =E  (l+ 6)-'u(cd)
t-0
where  E  is  the  expectations  operator,  ct  is  consumption  in  period  t,
and U  is  felicity, concave  in consumption.  The rate  at  which  utility  is
discounted,  that  is,  the  rate  of  pure  time preference,  is  6.  There is no
storage.  Output  and  price  are  each  subject  to  one  discrete  i.i.d.
random  disturbance  per  period.
To  dramatize  the  issues,  assume  that  exports  from  a  single
commodity account  for  33%  of  GNP  on  average,  and  suppose  that  the
coefficient  of  variation (CV) of  output  and price  of  the  commodity  are
both  30%,  and  that  the  correlation  between  output  and  price  can  be
ignored.  Suppose  also  that  all  other  income  is  nonstochastic  and  that
the  country  optimally  shares  risks  internally.  There  is,  however,  no
saving  or  borrowing  or  other  intertemporal  income  smoothing.  Using
3,r  a
the  standard  formulasl  for  the  cost  of  risk,  if  the  coefficient  of
relativc  risk  aversion  is  R  (defined  for  one-period  variations  in
consumption),  -nd  if  the  v V  of  consumption  is  s,  then  the  anrual  cost
of risk,  p. is  defined  implicitly  by  u(c-p)=P.u(c),  where  a  bar  over  a
variable  indicates  its  expected  value,  and  the  relative  cost,  pl/,  is
approximately  (exactly  if  utility  is  quadratic  in  income  per  period)
R s 2/2.  If  consumption  must  be  equal  to  income  each  year,  then
s = 0.33e  where  e  is  the  CV  of  export  revenue  (and  0.33  is  the
average  share  of  exports  to  GNP).  If  output  and  price  are
independently  normally  distributed,  then  e 2 = 0.19  (and this  will hold
approximately  even  if  output  and  price  are  not  normal).  In  this  case,
if  R  has  the  not  unreasonable  value  of  2,  the  cost  * f  risk  is
approximately  2%  of  average  income,  the  amount  representative
consumers  would  be  willing  to  forego  each  year  in  return  for  a
stabilized  consumption  stream  of  U.
Now,  this  figure  of  2%  of  income  locks  high-if  it  were
discounted at  10% real,  then it would amount to 20%  of  GNP, which is
a  sizeable  amount  of  wealth  to  give  up.  At  this  point,  one  should
draw  attention  to  a  potentially  serious  and  currently  unresolved
problem  in  interpreting  attitudes  to  risk.  Briefly,  the  problem  is  this.
Risk  aversion  as  originally  defined,  referred  to  static  problems  in
which  income,  wealth  and  consumption  were  all  equal  and  there  was
no  saving  (as  there  was  no  future).  In  this  context, the  coefficient  of
relative  risk  aversion,  RW,  is  defined  as  -WU"(W)/U'(W), where  W  is
'If  consumption c  is  a  random variable with coefficient of  variation s,
u(E(c)-p)  = Eu(c).  Expand  both  sides  in  a  Taylor  series:
u(E(c)) -pu'(E(c))  - u(E(c))  + 0.Ss2E(c)u"(E(c)) or p / E(c)  . 0.5s2R.
4n,alth.  In  practice,  income  and  consumption  differ,  and  attitudes  to
nsk  are  typically  defined  over  the  variations  in  annual  consumption.
The coefficient  of  partial  risk  aversion, Rp,  is  defined  as  -cU"(c)/U'(c)
=  (c/W)R.  Normally,  c/W  is  small,  tf  one  thinks  of  W  as  lifetime
wealth,  which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  small  variations  in  current
income  make  little  difference  to  lifetime  wealth,  and  so  should  not
lead  to  marked  fluctuations  in  consumption  and  should  not  therefore
be  very  costly,  in  present  value  terms.  In  fact,  the  assumption  that
consumers  behave  as  though  they  viewed  fluctuations  in  current
income  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  lifetime  wealth  appears  empirically
untrue,  as  Binswanger's  (1981)  experiments  suggest.  (See  also,  for  a
related  set  of  "anomalies",  Thaler,  1990.)
The  use  and  estimated  value  of  R  given  above  strictly  speaking
refers  to  partial  risk  aversion,  Rp,  which  appears  to  describe
behaviour,  though  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  it  accurately  measures
the true cost  of  the risk.  Put  it another way, if,  as  we  do,  we  observe
agents  violating  the  behavioral  predictions  of  the  theory,  then  we
should  be  wary  of  using  that  theory  to  measure  the  costs  of  risk.  It
is  hard  to  know  how  to  tespond  to  this  difficulty,  but  one  obvious
conclusion  is  that  it  may  be  seriously  misleading  to  compute  the
present  discounted  value  of  the  apparent  annual  costs  of  risk
measured  by  the  amount  of  consumption  the  consumer  would  be
willing  to  forego  in  order  to avoid  that risk.  This would turn  the cost
of  risk  into  a  wealth  measure,  which  is  inappropriate  given  that  risk
aversion  in  the  example  referred  to  fluctuations  in  income,  not  in
wealth.  It  therefore  remains  somewhat  unclear  whether  a  risk  cost
of  2%  of  annual consumption should be  viewed as  "small" or  "large".
5The example given above was over-dramatic in  its  estimate of
the amount of risk reduction which might be possibP.  The next step
is  to  inquire  into  the  likely  sizes  of  possible  risk  reduction  which
might come from reducing the effects of commodity price instability.
1.1  The  magnitude  of  the  problem
Newbery and  Stiglitz  (1981) estimated the  price  variability of
six agricultural primary commodities of  importance to  LDCs over the
per,od  1951-75.  They estimated the coefficient of  variation (CV) of
prices  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  Three  measures  are  of
particular relevance.  The first  is  the CV of  price changes from one
year  to  the  next,  or,  to  be  precise, the  standard deviation of  2(pt -
Pt-l)/(pt  + Pt-I).  This  is  a  crude  measure of  the  year  to  year
variability.  A  rather  better  measure  of  the  unpredictability  of
commodity price  movements is  the  CV  of  the  price  forecast errors.
Newbery  and  Stiglitz  used  a  simple  first  order  autoregressive
formula  to  predict  prices,  but  in  principle  more  sophisticated time
series methods could be used.  Finally, they gave the CV of deviations
from  5-year  centered  moving  averages,  which  measures  the
potential reduction in  price  instability which might be  achieved with
some  time-averaging  smoothing  resulting  perhaps  from  bIffering
prices, or  some other system of price smoothing.
They  found  that  the  5-year  moving  average  gave  the  lowest
measures of  instability, slightly lower than the  forecast errors, which
in  turn  were slightly lower than the CV of  price changes, thongh the
differences were  slight.  Newbery (1990) recently updated estimates
6of  the  variability  of  7  "soft"  commodities,  and  two  of  the  measures
are  given in Table  1.
The costs  of  price  instability  increase  as  the  square  of  tLde  CV,
which  means  that  if  we  take  the  measures  of  5-year  MA  for  the
period  1970-86,  coffee  price  instability  (CV  =  24%)  is  four  times  as
costly  as  that  of  Jute  (CV  =  12%), not  twice  as  cc'tly,  as  the figures
might  otherwise  suggest.  Table  2  gives  the  squared  CVs  for  these
two  measures  of  price  instability  for  the  two  periods.
It  is  desirable  to  reduce  price  instability  for  the  world  as  a
whole,  provided  that  it  is  not  too  expensive  to  do  so,  as  it  generates
arbitrage  benefits.  Indeed  the  price  series  reflect  the  fact  that
commodities  are  shifted  (via  storage)  from  low-price  low-value  dates
to  higher  price  higher  value  dates.  However,  the  exporting  countries
are  not  directly  concerned  with  the  worldwide  benefits  of
stabilization,  and  are  instead  interested  in  what  happens  to  their
average  export  revenue  and  its  variability.  International  buffer
stock  schemes  normally  affect  the  average  revenues  received  by
exporting  countries,  and  Newbery  aaid  Stiglitz  (1981)  argued  that
exporters  might  be  adversely  affected  in  the  absence  of  supply
restrictions.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  countries  individually  act  to
reduce  the  costs  of  risk,  then  they  mav  have  little  effect  on  average
revenue.  Suppose  we  consider  the  effect  of  stabilizing  the  price
received  by  these  countries  on  the  variability  of  their  export
revenue.  Newbery  and  Stigl.tz  (1981,  chapter  20)  estimated  the
impact  or  completely  stabilizing  the  price  on  the  variability  of  crop
export  revenues  by  country.  For  typical  countries  price  stabilization
had  a  rather  small  effect  on  the  crop  export  revenue  instability,  as
7this  was  often  largely  determined by  variations  in  quantities.  In
some  cases  the  reduction  in  variability  was  appreciable,  and  well
worth  having.
At  this  point it  is  worth asking an  important question:  How
should the  cost  of  country-level risk  be  measured?  If  the  primary
product  producers  face  world  prices,  and  if  these  are  stabilized in
some  way,  then  the  relevant  measure depends  on  the  variability  of
income from that commodity.  If, on  the  other hand, the governn.,nt
already buffers  domestic incomes, then  the  risk  costs  are  borne  by
the  government and  the  relevant  question  is  what  happens  to  the
variability of  total  export revenue.
In  the  present paper  we are  primarily concerned with  country
level  instability,  assuming  that  the  government  is  successful  in
shifting risk  from  producers to  the  government.  It  would therefore
be  useful  to  update  these earlier  estimates, broadening the  question
to  ask  what  effect  price  stabilization might  have  on  overall export
revenue variability, rather than just  on  that  part of  export variability
arising  from  the  commodity exports.  Table  3  shows the  results  of
such an  exercise for  copper price  stabilization for  four  countries for
which copper was the  main export, and  for coffee price  stabilization
in Brazil and Colombia.
The table  shows that  stabilizing the price  of copper and coffee
has  a  rather  small  effect  on  the  variability  of  export  revenues for
these commodities, and a  smaller effect stil.  Jn  the variability of total
export revenue.  Figure 1 shows the effect of  stabilizing the price of
copper  for  Zambia,  which  is  the  extreme  example  of  a  country
heavily  dependent  on  one  primary  commodity.  The  vertical
8logarithmic  scale  gives  the  current  US  $  value  of  exports.  Total
exports, as  can  be  seen, are  almost synon;mous with copper exports
(shown dotted), while total  exports when copper prices are stabilized
are  shown as  the  heavier  line.  The 5-year moving average of  this
stabilized export revenue is  shown dashed, and is  the reference level
against which to compare the CV of variations.
The figures 3  through 6  show the effect of stabilizing the price
of coffee for Brazil and Colombia.  The vertical logarithmic scale gives
the deflated U.S. $  value of  exports.  Figures 3  and 5  give deflated
export values.  Figures 4  and 6  give the percentage deviations from
the  5  year  Moving  Average.  In  the  second  case,  the  graphs  of
deviations  of  commodity  exports  and  total  exports  are  displaced
vertically to make it easier to  see what is  going on-coffee  deviations
are  shown on  the  left-hand scale  and total  exports are on  the  right-
hand  scale.  In  botk cases  stabilizing the price of  the main primary
export  appears to  have little  effect  either  on  the  variability  of  real
income -rom  the commodity or of  total export reve-nue.  It  might be
argueo  that  supply  variability  would  be  reduce  with  reductions  in
price  variability,  in  which  case  price  stabilization would  be  more
favourable than  the  graphs and table  suggests.
2.  Buffering  the  Export  Price  Instability
Using  Conventional  Instruments
2.1  Loans  and  Savings
Countries have a  variety of  alternatives when confronted with
instability in  the price of  their key export.  If  commodity prices are
uncorrelated from year  to  year,  and fluctuate around a  known trend,
9and  if  the  country  can  lend  and  borrow  freely  on  international
financial  markets,  then  consumption  can  be  smoothed  out  by  lending
and  borrowing.  The  fluctuations  in  consumption  will  thus  be
substantially  reduced  and  the  cost  of  the  risk  correspondingly
reduced.
Even  if  the  country  cannot  borrow, it  can  accumulate  savings  in
buffer  funds  which  can  be  drawn  down  in  adverse  times  with  a
substantial  reduction  in  the  costs  of  risk.  Papua  New  Guinea  has
followed  a  conservative  policy  of  averaging  export  receipts  from
copper  (and  other  less  critical  export  crops)  over  a  lengthy  time
horizon,  with  a  buffer  fund  held  in  convertible  currency.  While  it  is
rare  for  a  developing  country  to  resist  the  temptation  to  invest  such
funds  in  its  own  capital  stock  (thereby  losing  the  international
liquidity  needed  to  buffer  trade  fluctuations),  both  the  International
Monetary  Fund,  through  its  Compensating  Financial  Facility,  and  the
Lom6  countries,  through  STABEX,  offer  a  similar  buffering  facility,
being  prepared  to  lend  to  countries  at  favorable  rates  when  their
export  earnings  drop  sufficiently  below  trend.
Can  a  country  optimally  smooth  consumption  by  borrowing  and
lending  from  overseas  sources?  Let  us  consider  the  most  favorable
and  simplest  case.  Suppose  that  export  revenue  fluctuates  from
period  to  period  in  a  serially  uncorrelated  way  with  no  trend,  and
that  the  utility  function  is  quadratic,  and  that  the  rate  of  pure  time
preference,  6,  is  equal  to  the  rate  of  interest,  r,  abroad,  then  the
country  would  have  no  motive  for  saving  or  borrowing  other  that  to
smooth  consumption.  We  make  this  assumption  to  focus  on  the
consumption  smoothing  aspect  of  international  boffowing,  and  to
10show  the  kinds  of  problems  that  arise  even  in  this  simple  case,  when
serial  correlation  is  ignored.
If  there  are  no  constraints  on  lending  and  borrowing,  then  the
optimally  smoothed  consumption  of  a  borrower  committed  to
borrowing  and  lending  only  for  smoothing  and  to  meeting  his
interest  payment  obligations  is  (Newbery  and  Stiglitz,  1981,  pp.  201-
3)  Ct = Et(ct+l)  =  Y,- rLt.  Under  this  scheme  accumulated  debt,  Lt
follows  a  discrete  random  walk  with  increment  equal  to  the
difference  between  income,  yt,  and its  mean value, y.  If  this  scheme
is  to continue to  work, there must be  no limit on L.  But in finite  time,
L  will  pass  the  value  at  which  reputation  becomes  more  attractive
than  continued  interest  payments,  even  if  lending  and  borrowing
opportunities  are  then  cut  off.  Knowing  this,  competitive  lenders
would  not  make  unlimited  loans.  Any  feasible  loans  would  offer  at
best  only  suboptimal  and/or  impermanent  smoothing.
Before  addressing  this  particular  income  smoothing  problem,  it
makes  sense  to  look  at  other  complications  which  affect  income
smoothing  by  lending  and  borrowing,  and  also  to  examine  alternative
instruments  available.  The  first  qualification  is  that,  either  because
of  poverty,  or,  more  plausibly,  because  of  the  shortage  of  capital,  the
rate  at  which  the  country  discounts  future  income  (i.e.  the  return  to
investment)  is  higher  than  the  world  rate  of  interest.  This  would
imply  that  in  the  absence  of  uncertainty  the  country  should  borrow
as  much as  is prudent (i..e.  as  much as  it would be  willing to repay).
This  will  affect  the  potential  for  income  smoothing,  for  two
reasons.  First,  there  is  a  temptation  to  approach  the  prudential
borrowing  limit,  which  reduces  the  ability  to  buffer  shortfalls  in
11income  by  further  borrowing.  This  would  not  be  so  important if
current  investment could be  readily  scaled back  at  an  intertemporal
opportunity cost close  to  the  marginal return to  investment.
The  next  complication is  that  public  sector  expenditures may
be  hard  to  adjust  swiftly.  At  each  moment  there  may  be  high
adjustment costs  to departing form the original plan,  and the  fraction
of  the  budget  which  is  available  for  reallocation  may  be  initially
small, and growing over time.  Certainly countries experiencing major
debt  crises  and  an  urgent need for  structural adjustment have  found
it  very  hard  to  make  more  than  gradual  adjustments  to  current
public  expenditures.  If  so,  then  recent  work  on  hysteresis  and
adjustment costs  by  Dixit  suggests that  governments should  embark
on  such  expenditure  programs  only  when  their  rate  of  return
exceeds some test  rate  of  discount by  an  adequate margin to  cover
the  possibility  of  incurring  adjustment  costs  from  premature
abandonment.
A  problem with  consumption smoothing is  that  it  requires the
country to  know  the  trend  level  of  earnings (and  hence  commodity
price) about which to  smooth.  If  prices follow a random walk, then
the  best  estimate  of  the  future  price  is  the  current  price,  and  the
more quickly consumption is  adjusted to  the revised level  of  export
earnings,  the  better.  Put  another way,  the  variability  in  underlying
wealth (or permanent income) is a  small fraction (equal to  the rate of
interest)  of  the  variability  in  current  earnings  if  these  fluctuate
around  a  constant  level,  but  is  equal  to  the  variability  in  current
earnings if  prices  follow a  random walk.  The costs  of  risk  in  the
latter  case  are  thus  much greater.  It  is  therefore important to  see
12which  of  these  two  extremes-serially  uncorrelated  prices  or  prices
which  follow  a  random walk-is  nearer  the  truth.
2.2  Consumption  smoothing  with  serial  correlation
Many  of  the  major  traded  primary  commodities  exhibit
significant  annual  serial  correlation  which  dramatically  affects  the
costs  and  the  benefits,  and  the  feasibility  of  price  stabilization.
Cuddington  and  Urzdia (1987)  have  attempted  to  identify  the  extent
to  which  price  changes  of  primary  commodities  persist,  using  annual
data  on  24  commodity  prices  for  the  period  1900-1987,  deflated  by
an  index  of  manufacturing  unit  values.  They  regress  the  change  in
the  log  of  the  real  commodity  price  on  a  constant  plus  error,  e(t),
which  is  in  turn  expressed  at  A(L)u(t),  where  u(t)  is  white  noise.
Their  measure  of  persistence  is  then  ai,  where  ai  are  the  coefficients
of  A(L),  and  is  a  measure of  the extent  to which the price  change will
persist.
Table  4,  reproduced  from  Cuddington  and  Urzua  (1987),  gives
the  persistence  measures  of  three  groups  of  commodities,  each  group
ranked  in  increasing  order  of  persistence.  (It  also  gives  the  highest
order  significant  lag  for  the  more  parsimonious  lag  specification).
Thus if  one looks  at cocoa, 65 percent  of  a price change  is expected to
persist,  and  the  remaining  35  percent  can  be  accounted  by  short
term  fluctuations,  with  a  maximum  (statistically  significant)  lag  of
two  years.  In  each  group  the  average  persistence  is  over  50 percent,
and  for  many  commodities  prices  seem  to  follow  a  random  walk  with
persistence  of  100  percent.  It  was  impossible  to  reject  the  null
hypothesis  that  all  commodity  price  series  followed  a  random  walk
13using  the  (rather  weak)  statistical  tests  available.  One  must
interpret  this  rather  carefully,  for  even  if  it  is  hard  to  reject  the
hypothesis  that  commodity  prices  follow  random  walks,  there  are  no
plausible  theories  which  suggest  that  these  prices  should  follow
random  walks,  and  rather  good  arguments  why  eventually  they
should  return  to  an  equilibrium  determined  by  demand  and  supply.
Deaton  and  Laroque  (1989)  have  also  studied  this  problem,
using  more  sophisticated  methods,  but  the  same  commodity  price
data.  Their  measures  of  persistence  are  the  sum  of  all
autocorrelation  coefficients  (whether  significant  or  not),  with  the
sums  being  linearly  declining  weighted  averages  over  the  window
widths  of  20  or  40  years.  Their  results  are  reported  in  Table  5.
Where  the  same  commodity  appeals  in  both  studies  the  measures  of
persistence  from  both  studies  are  given  in  Table  4.  In  some  cases
the  agreement  is  close--thus  either  45  or  59  percent  of  the  price
shock  in  bananas  is  persistent,  similarly  for  rice  and  palm  oil.  For
others  the  differences  are  considerable,  with  Deaton  and  Laroque's
(more  reliable)  measures  tending  to  be  'ower  than  those  of
Cuddington  and  Urzu'a, which  Deaton  and  Laroque  argue  are  likely  on
statistical  grounds  to  be  biassed  upwards.
If  one  takes  the  Cuddington  and  Urzua  evidence  then  perhaps
one-half  of  price  shocks  are  persistent  for  many  of  the  important
export  crops  of  developed  countries.  If  one  takes  Deaton  and
Laroque's  estimates  then  about  one-quarter  of  price  shocks  are
permanent.  Even  in  this  case,  though,  Table  5  shows  the  high  first-
order  autocorrelations,  so  three-quarters  or  more  of  the  price  shock
will  persist  for  at  least  a  year,  and  even  after  two  years  typically  60
14percent  of  the  price  shock  will  persist.  The  evidence  suggests,
therefore,  that  serial  correlation  is  prevalent  for  the  world  prices  of
primary  commodities,  and  this  fact  should  be  taken  into  account  in
designing  methods  for  consumption  smoothing.
If  income  is  serially  correlated  because  prices  are  serially
correlated,  a  fall  in  current  income  signals  lower  than  anticipated
income  next  year,  and  hence  lower  Yt+l  and lower ct+1  (other  things
being  equal).  This  will  raise  u'(ct+ 1)  and  hence  lower  current
consumption.  If  the  autoregression  coefficient  is  near  unity,
consumption  may  be  depressed  almost  as  much  as  current  income
and  little  smoothing  will  take  place.
2.3  Price  stabilization
If  it  is  unattractive  or  infeasible  to  stabilize  consumption  by
lending  and  borrowing,  then  perhaps  it  is  possible  to  partially
stabilize  income  and  hence  reduce  the  need  to  smooth  consumption
relative  to  income.  If  part  of  the  reason  for  the  export  revenue
fluctuations  lies  in  commodity  price  instability,  then  perhaps  price
stabilization  would  achieve  this  goal.  For  the  moment  we  ignore  the
fact  that  feasible  market  stabilization  generally  changes  mean  price.
(See  for  example  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  1981,  or  Williams  and  Wright
forthcoming.)  If  we  also  ignore  the  distinction  between  income  and
consumption,  then  the risk  benefits of  reducing the  CV  of  income as  a
proportion  of  initial  income  are  approximately  1/ 2RA[  a],  where  A[xJ
means  the  change  in  x and  a,is  the CV of  income, and R  is  again the
coefficient  of  (partial)  relative  risk  aversion.  If  price  and  3utput  are
uncorrelated  and  income  is  taken  as  price  times  output,  then  the
15change  in the  squared  CV of  income will be  the same as  the change  in
the  squared  CV  of  price,  and  the  risk  benefit  will  be  1/ 2R(1- a 2 )ao  .
On  the  earlier  assumption  that  the  coefficient  of  partial  risk  aversion
is  about 2,  if  a = 1/2,  and  the  share  of  exports  to  GDP  is  again  one-
third,  (so  that  if  risks  are  spread  over  the  whole  of  GDP  then  the
value  of  ap  must  be  divided  by  3),  the  risk  benefits  are  then  three
fourths  of  the  total  cost  of  the  income  (consumption)  instability.
It  is  not  sufficient  in  this  case  to  stabilize  domestic  income, for
that  merely  shifts  the  risk  from  the  producer  to  the  government.
International  price  stabilization  may  be  able  to  achieve  these  gains,
though,  as  noted  above,  with  consequent  problems  of  lowering  the
average  price  and  revenue  to  the  exporting  country.  Moreover,  few
commodities  are  at  any  moment  subject  to  successful  international
price  stabilization  schemes,  and  so  this  option  is  typically  not
available  (Gardner  1986; Gilbert  1986).  What  is  needed  is  some  way
for  the  country  to  secure  stable  or  partially  stabilized  prices,  and  the
obvious  answer  is  to  use  futures  or  forward  markets,  in  the  absence
of  international  price  stabilization.
2.4  Futures  contracts
If  prices  were  serially  uncorrelated  (which  in  turn  means  that
storage  from  year  to  year  is  negligible)  and  if  the  futures  price  at  the
start  of  the  crop  year  were  an  unbiased  predictor  of  the  post-harvest
spot  price,  then  there  would  be  no  reason  for  the  opening  futures
price  to  vary  from  year  to  year,  and  the  producer  could  lock  in  the
same,  stable  price  each  year.  Potatoes  in  the  US  provide  a  good
example  of  such  a  commodity,  for  carryovers  are  costly  and  unusual.
16But,  as  we  have  seen,  serial  correlation  is  prevalent,  and  the  best
start-of-year  predictor  of  next  year's  post  harvest  price  (i.e.  the
opening  futures  price)  is  unlikely  to  be  the  same  as  last  year's  start-
of-year's  forecast,  or  the  opening futures  price  last  year.  It  is  now  no
longer  so  easy  to  stabilize  income  from  year  to  year  by  hedging  on
futures  markets  at  the  start  of  the  year.
To  see  what  role  futures  markets  may  play,  let  us  define
notation:
Pt  Spot  price  at  harvest  in  year  t
Ft,j  Futures  price  for  delivery  after  harvest  in
year  t  at  date  j  - t.
bt  = Pt - Ft,t  Contemporaneous  basis
ft .Ft.t-j  futures  price  at  start  of  year  t
ft+1  - ft  Intertemporal  basis
Trading  in  futures  markets  exposes  producers  to  two  different
kinds  of  risk,  both  confusingly  called  basis  risk.  Contemporaneous
basis  risk  arises  because  the  producer  who  has  sold  futures  to  hedge
output  typically  liquidates  this  by  buying  them  back  in  the  terminal
month,  and  selling  his  output.  If  the  terminal  futures  price  were
equal  to  the  spot  price  there  would  be  no  risk,  but  in  general  this  is
not  true,  so  ex  ante  the  producer  faces  the  risk  that  the  two  prices
will  not  be  the  same-that  is,  he  faces  basis risk  at  the  point  of  sale.
While  this  basis  is  the  stuff  on  which  futures  markets  survive  or
perish,  the  risk  involved is  small  compared to  the  risk  of  not  hedging
for  most  producers  (i.e.  those  for  which  the  futures  market  offers  an
appropriate  contract).  Of  countries  exporting  primary  commodities,
many  are  selling  on  forward  contracts  which  are  linked  to  terminal
17futures  prices,  for  which  there  is  clearly  no  such  basis  risk  (though,
for  example,  transport  costs  to  that  point  might  be  another  source  of
risk  in  practice).  We  shall  therefore  ignore  this  type  of  risk,  and
assume  in  what  follows  that  bt  = 0, or Ft,t  = Pt.  We  shall  also  adopt
the  convention  that  Ext  a  Et  1xt,  and  assume  that  the  futures  market
is  unbiased, so  that ft  = Et-lPt.
Suppose  prices  follow  the  simple  autoregressive  scheme:
(2)  pt = ap,, +  (1- a)p + u,
where  fit is  i.i.d.  with  zero  mean,  and  is  the  forecast  error.  This  can
also  be  written  as
p1=f  +iiu,  f,=E  p  = op,+  (1-osp
Again,  ft  is  the  expected price,  equal  to  the  futures  price  at  the
start  of  period  t  in  an  unbiased  market.  The  intertemporal  basis,
f.+.- t =a(pt-p,-,),  will  now  fluctuate  from  year  to  year,  possibly
substantially.  Hedging  from  year  to  year  on  futures  markets  will  not
provide  insurance  against  this  basis  risk,  but  in  the  Appendix  we
show  how  to  construct  a  sequence  of  rollover  !'  dges  in  the  futures
market  that  provides  considerable  risk  reduction  and  insurance
against  this  basis  risk.  Even  if  futures  markets  only  extend  one  year
ahead,  it  is  possible  to  roll  over  hedges  to  provide  additional  income
smoothing  to  that  achievable  within  the  crop  year.
The  way  the  roll-over  works  is  to  sell  more  futures  initially
than  needed  for  one-period  hedging,  and  then  use  the  surplus
18futures  sales  to  finance  the  next  year's  futures  transactions.  This  is
not  perfect,  for  the  amount  of  hedging  required  next  year  will
depend  on  production,  and  that  will  depend  on  the  futures  price
prevailing  next  year,  which  is  not  yet  known.  Consequently,  despite
the  absence  of  production  risk,  future  output  cannot  be  perfectly
hedged,  and  there  remains  some  residual  risk  (as  there  would  be  if
there  were  output  risk).  Nevertheless,  because  the  costs  of  risk
increase  with  the  square  of  the  deviation,  reducing  the  risk  by  a
given  fraction  reduces  the  cost  of  risk  by  more  than  that  fraction  and
can  be  worthwhile.
The  appendix  shows  how  to  construct  a  rolling  n-period  hedge
for  the  special  case  of  no  output  risk,  but  supply  responsive  to
futures  prices.  The  model  has  a  linear  supply  schedule  (linear  in  the
futures  price,  which  is  the  action  certainty  equivalent  price  in  the
absence  of  output  risk).  In  year  t,  production  qt  is  planned,  and  at
the  start  of  the  year  qjll+ a+...+(a/8)n'-]  hedges  are  sold  on  the
futures  market.  Hedping  for  longer  periods  reduces  risk,  but
requires  additional  pur  Uases  of  hedges,  which  of  course  involve
additional  transactions  costs.  The  Appendix  derives  a  formula  for
the  value  of  the  additional  risk  benefit  derived  per  extra  present
value  of  hedge,  as  increasing  the  current  number  of  rollovers
involves  a  stream  of  future  transaction  costs  as  well  as  a  flow  of
future  risk  benefits.  The  formula  for  the  marginal  benefit/cost  ratio
from  increasing  the  period  of  hedging  from  n-1  to  n  (and  the  number
of  hedges by  (ap-)u 1)  when  each  extra  futures  contract  costs  g  is
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Clearly,  as  the  time  horizon  of  the  hedge  increases,  the
marginal  benefit  also  falls.  Figure  2  graphs  the  ratio  of  risk  benefits
to  additional  costs  for  four  different  values  of  the  serial  correlation
coefficient,  when  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  is  1,  the
discount  rate  is  5 per  cent real,  the  CV of  forecast  error  is  15 percent,
and  the transaction  costs  as  a fraction  of  the  value  of  the  hedpe is  0.3
of  1% - a  figure taken from Gardner (1989).
Thus  the  graph  shows  that  if  a =  0.8,  then  it  would  be  worth
setting n  = 4,  and  at  a  =  0.9,  n  should  be  8.  But  it  is  clear  that  the
value  of  such  hedging  (on  the  favorable  assumption  of  no  output
risk)  is  quite  low,  as  transaction  costs  are  low  and  the  benefit-cost
ratio  is  in  terms  of  these  transaction  costs.  Higher  transactions  costs
would  shorten  the  horizon  over  which  hedging  was  cost-effective.
The  other  point  to  make  is  that  the  number  of  hedges  rises
with  the  horizon,  which  would  increase  the  risk  of  performance
default  if  the  contracts  did  not  require  payment  of  margin  calls  as
the  futures  price  changes,  to  cover  any  change  in  the  value  of  the
contract.  The  transaction  costs  calculated  by  Gardner  include  the
foregone  interest  rate  differential  on  the  money  left  on  deposit  to
cover  margin  calls,  and  this  can  be  thought  of  as  ensuring  contract
performance.  A  country  could  follow  this  hedging  strategy  and  avoid
performance  risk,  if  it  were  unconstrained  in  credit  markets.  Bue
this  is  exactly  the  situation  in  which  lending  and  borrowing  would
also  be  a  viable  consumption  smoothing  strategy.
20If  the  exporter  is  credit  constrained,  then  performance  risk
must  be  a  serious  issue,  and  the  hedging  strategy  may  not  be
available.  Instead  it  may  be  more  logical  to  consider  how  commodity
bonds  might  be  used  for  consumption  smoothing  even  in  the
presence  of  default  risk.  Let  us  begin  with  a  brief  review  of
commodity  bonds  as  they  have  been  used  in  practice.
3.  Commodity  Bonds
Commodity  bonds  are  bonds  whose  terminal  value  (and
perhaps  dividend  payments)  are  denominated  in  units  of  physical
commodity  (or  the  terminal  value  of  some  appropriate  futures
contract).  Thus,  a  country  might  issue  a  bond  paying  10  ounces  of
gold  in  10  years'  time  with  a  current  face  value  of  $3,000  or  a  bond
paying  one  lot  of  10  tonnes  of  December  maturing  U.S.  futures  in
cocoa  for  10  years  with  a  terminal  payment  of  25  contracts  for  a
current  face  value  of  $350,000.  Typically,  the  buyer  has  an  option  to
receive  the  face  value  or  the  commodity  bundle.  That  is,  the  bond
usually  comes  with  a call  option for  the  buyer.
Before  the  second  (1979)  oil  shock  awakened  the  corporate
interest  in  commodity  bonds,  governmerts  were  already  using  these
instruments  for  various  purposes.  In  1863  the  Confederate  States  of
America  issued  bonds  payable  in  bales  of  cotton  (O'Hara).  The French
government  used  an  electricity-indexed  bond  to  compensate  for
1945 nationalization  of  its  utilities;  and  in  1973 "Le  Giscard,"  a  $1.5
billion  issue  with  an  untimely  gold-guaranteed  redemption  value,
was  designed  to  persuade  French  gold  hoarders  to  deposit  their
hidden  treasure  with  the  government  (New  York  Times).  The  type  of
21internationally-oriented  government  financing  considered  here  was
initiated  later  in  the  decade  when  a  Mexican  government  agency
made  several  bond  issues  in  local  currency  backed  by  barrels  of
crude  oil.
Recently,  corporations  have  issued  bonds  with  returns
(principal  and/or  interest)  payable  in  silver  (Sunshine  Mining);  gold
(Peggold);  oil (Standard Oil  Company); coal  (Semirara Coal  Corporation
of  the  Philippines);  and,  for  small  investors  requiring  guaranteed
liquidity  of  another  sort,  wine  from  the  French  Dordogne  (Henry
Ryman  of  the  United  Kingdom)  or  port  wine  (Dourosa  Investments,
United  Kingdom).2
3.1  Smoothing  with  Commodity  Bonds  under  Full
Commitment
If  the  borrower  can  be  fully  committed  to  honor  her  contracts,
commodity  bonds  are  a  powerful  means  of  smoothing  price
variation.To  simplify  the  exposition,  assume  that  the  package  under
discussion  is  a  zero-coupon  bond  issued  by  the  borrower  with
repayment  upon  maturity  consisting  only  of  a  completely  specified
commodity  bundle.  We  assume  the  purchaser  (lender)  is  competitive
and  market  risk-neutral  with  respect  to  this  bond  (see  O'Hara  for
analysis  of  the  demand  side  of  the  market  for  c-bonds  under  other
assumptions).  As  above,  assume  initially  that  all  contracts  are  always
honored.
2The  port contract  is a prTe  zero coupon  commodity  bond; other  contracts  contain
options  to  redeem  at monetary  face  value.
22Under  these  assumptions,  if  the  country  issues  c-bonds  (which
in  this  model  need  only  be  one-period  bonds)  and  if  these  can  be
issued  (and  indefinitely  re-issued)  at  the  present  value  of  the
expected  price  for  next  period,  then  their  risk-reducing  properties  in
the  steady  state  are  exactly  the  same  as  those  of  an  optimal  forward
or  futures  hedge  at  the  same  price.  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  (p.  186)
show  that,  in  the  case  of  stationary,  uncorrelated  output  and  price
disturbances,  the  ratio  of  income  variance  with  and  without  optimal
forward  hedging,  is  roughly  1/(1  +  k2 ),  where  k  is  the  ratio  of  the
CVs  of  price  and  output.  In  our  numerical  example  in  Section  1
above,  k  equals  1.  If  there  is  no  other  means  of  consumption
smoothing  by  lending  and  borrowing,  then  c-bonds  will  halve  the
steady state costs  of  the risk-to  1  % of  GNP in our example. If the  CV
of  income  were  the  same,  but  only  price  were  stochastic,  then  c-
bonds eliminate risk,  worth  2% of  GNP.
Assume,  henceforth,  that  no  other  borrowing  is  possible  and
that  all  income  variation  is  due  to  price.  Then  with  credible
commitment,  complete  smoothing  is  achieved  by  selling  c-bonds  for
the  whole  (deterministic)  output.  The  borrower  then  has  constant
income  and  consumption  and  delivers  all  output  of  random  value  to
the  lender.
But  what  makes  the  commitment  to  deliver  credible?  Is  this
simple  commodity  bond  contract  subgame  perfect?  Note  first  that  the
lender's  obligation  within  this  contract  is  fulfilled  at  the  start  of  the
deal,  by  making  the  loan.  Only  the  borrower  has  an  unfulfilled
obligation  after  the  initial  loan.
23So  within  the  contract  period,  only  the  sovereign  borrower  has
any  unfulfilled  obligation,  so  she  alone  has  an  incentive  to  default.
The  incentive  for  her  to  default  is  state-dependent.  This  case  with
pure  price  uncertainty  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7,  in  which  the  world
spot  price  P,  is  on  the  horizontal  axis  and  the  exporter's  contract
payment  per  unit  committed  are  shown  on  the  vertical  axis.  If  all
sales  are  spot,  then  payment  per  unit  and  Pt  are  related  by  the  450
line OA.
The  simple  (non-contingent)  commodity  bond  can  be
considered  as  a  combination  of  a  one-period  loan  and  a  forward
contract  of  the  same  duration.  Under  a  forward  contract,  the
borrower's  incentive  to  default  is  the  difference  between  the  spot
price  at  maturity,  Pt,  and  the  forward  price  to  be  paid  on  delivery.
The  latter  equals  the  expected  price  P  as  of  the  signing  of  the
contract,  under  the  assumptions  of  risk  neutrality,  competitive
buyers,  and  credible  seller  commitment  to  deliver.  The  short-run
temptation  to  default  (to  be  weighed  against  any  effects  on  future
smoothing  opportunities)  is  P, - P;  the  higher  the  spot  price,  the
greater  the  temptation.  The  short-run  default  incentive  of  the  buyer
of  the  contract  (the  "long"  side) is,  symmetrically, P - P.
In  a  commodity  bond  contract,  the  borrower  incurs  at  the
outset  a  repayment  obligation  of  P  per unit of  exports (from a  loan of
P/(1  +  r)  per  unit  in  the  previous  period)  in  addition  to  the  delivery
obligation.  This  adds  the  amount  of  the  loan  repayment  under
compliance,  P,  to  the  short-run  incentive  to  default.  The  temptation
to  default is  thus  P,.
24This  default  temptation  at  time  t  must  be  balanced  against  the
opportunity  cost  of  defaulting.  For  full  commitment  the  latter  must
dominate.  For  conventional  domestic  lending  the  loan  is  backed  by
collateral  that  may  be  seized  by  the  lender  in  the  event  of  default.
Assuming  the  lender  has  sufficient  collateral,  default  does  not  occur.
In  the  finance  literature,  studies  of  the  pricing  of  cowmmodity
bonds  (Schwartz;  Carr)  do  not  distinguish  bonds  issued  by  foreign
governments  from  private  corporate  bond  issues-though  the  recent
literature  on  foreign  borrowing  recognizes  that  the  distinction  is
crucial  for  ordinary  bonds.  It  is  also  crucial  for  commodity bonds.
3.2  Sovereign  borrowing  and  default  prevention
The  main  distinction  between  corporate  and  sovereign
borrowing,  described  in  masterly  fashion  by  Keynes  and
incorporated  in  the  seminal  work  of  Eaton  and  Gersovitz,  is  that
collateral  is  generally  unavailable  to  creditors  of  a  sovereign
borrower  since  the  assets  of  the  latter  are  located  within  its  borders.
Only  in  exceptional  cases  can  they  be  attached  by  lenders  in  the
event  of  default.  In  the  absence  af  attachable  collateral,  some
substitute  must  be  found  if  any  lending  is  to  occur  in  equilibrium.
Three  such  substitutes,  recognized  in  the  literature,  are  witholding  of
future  access  to  loans,  direct  intervention  backed  by  military  power,
and  interference  with  trade  (Eaton  and  Gersovitz  1981,  Bulow  and
Rogoff  1989).
The absence  of  a  final  distribution  of  assets  to  creditors  as  seen
in  domestic  bankruptcy  also  changes  the  nature  of  default  on
25conventional  loans.  It  arises  in  the  context  of  a  sequence  of  strategic
moves  by  creditors  and  the  sovereign  debtor  who  retains  (and,  in
fact,  cannot  credibly  foreswear)  the  power  to  make  subsequent
decisions  that  affect  the  interests  of  creditors.  The  cost  and
uncertainty  of  these  renegotiations  is  widely  recognized  as  a  serious
problem  for  lenders,  borrowers  and  intermediaries.
Here  we  focus  on  income-smoothing  financial  transactions
between  investors  in  developed  countries  (DCs)  and  a  less-developed
country  (LDC)  heavily  dependent  on  a  single  commodity  subject  to
substantial  revenue  fluctuations.  The  default  penalty  is  enforcement
of  debt  seniority  clauses  in  the  courts  of  all  potential  financial
partners  of  lender  nations  so  that  a  defaulter's  foreign  investments
or  servicing  of  new  debt  would be  subject  to  seizure.  Default  means
permanent  elimination  of  foreign  borrowing  or  lending  opportunities.
We  assume  throughout  that  the  lenders  in  developed  countries  must
always  honor  their  commitments.3
The  cost  of  default  is  the  loss  of  expected  future  consumption
smoothing  that  could  be  had  given  no  default  at  time  t.  The
borrower's  motivation  to  fulfill  her  part  of  the  contract  depends  on
her  expectations  of  continued  lending  (beyond  current  contractual
horizons)  conditional  on  her  current  behavior.  If  her  behavior
complies  with  equilibrium  expectations  of  the  lender,  then  she  can
expect  the  competitive  lenders  to  be  willing  to  conform  to  the
equilibrium  in  the  future  as  they  have  proved  to  currently.
3For  an anlysis  under  the alternate  assumption,  see  Kletzer  and  Wright  (1990).
26If  the  price  distribution  is  such  that  P  is  always  less  than  the
minimum  level  that  makes  default  profitable,  there  is  no  default
problem,  and  borrower  commitment  to  repay  in  all  states  is  credible.
If  not,  then  potential  lenders,  foreseeing  the  possibility  of  default,
realize  the  above  contract  will  yield  an  expected loss,  and  do  not  buy
the  bond.
The  credibility  of  a  no-default  commitment  depends  upon  the
parameters  of  the  model.  Henceforth  we  concentrate  on  the  case  of
pure  price  uncertainty  with  income  y = pq,where  q  is  fixed  output.
Consider  the  simple  example  in  which  y  and  P  normalized  at  unity,
and  y, = y(l + u).  The  probability  density  for  the  multiplicative
disturbance  u  is  i.i.d.  with  u=+/-v,  each  with  probability  of  one  half,
so  that  the  coefficient  of  variation of  price,  and  of  income  is  v.  The
annual  current  cost  of  risk  in  this  case  is  Rv2/2  with  present  value
Rv2/2r,  where  r  is  the discount  rate.
Consider  the  stochastic  steady  state  in  which  a  fraction  a  of
output, 0  <  a  <  1,  is  covered  each  period  by  commodity  bonds.  Each
period  a  fraction  a  of  output  is  delivered  in  payment  of  the  previous
loan and a new loan of  al(l  + r)  is received. Given a  price draw of  (1
+  vt),  consumption  is  [(1  - a)(l  + v,) + a/(I  + r)]  if  the  old  contract  is
fulfilled.  The  contract  is  rationally  honored  if  the  current  temptation
to  default,  v-av,  is  less  than  the  present  value  of  the  extra  risk  cost
incurred,  Rv2(1-a 2)/2  ,  that  is,  if  r<Rv(l+a)/2;  coverage  of  at  least
some portion  of  output  is feasible  if  r<Rv/2.
4.  Overview  of  Dynamic  Smoothing  Strategies
4.1  Default  Constraint  Nonbinding
27From  an  initial  uncovered  situation,  the  availability  of
commodity  bonds  adds  to  the  short-run  resources  represented  by
initial  income  y,.  Assume  that  the  sovereign  starts  with  no  savings,
but  that  she  can  save  overseas  in  the  countries  that  host  the
international  lenders.  Assume  also  that  the3e  lender  countries
collectively  enforce  financial  contracts  within  their  borders.  In
particular,  they  cooperatively  enforce  claims  by  foreigners  on
domestic  assets,  and  senior  claims  of  domestic  lenders  on  sovereign
borrowers  are  enforced  with  respect  to  all  inflows  from  sovereign
borrowers,  including  savings  deposits  as  well  as  loan  repayments.4
If  so,  one  description  of  the  optimal  infinite  horizon  smoothing  plan
for  implementation  in  period  1,  given  current  income,  y,  (assumed
for  this  exposition  to  be  entirely  from  export  of  one  commodity  at
price  p),  and  the  discount  rate  equal  to  the  interest  rate  is  as  follows:
Invest  B8  yl,  where ,B  - 1/(1  + r),  overseas for  a  certain  periodic rate  of
return  of  r,  issue  a  simple  c-bond  payable  in  units  of  the  commodity
to  cover  all  output,  with  current  sale  price  fi y,  and  consume
r.8y1 +  Py in  each  period  1,  2,  3,....  Full  consumption  smoothing  is
immediately  achieved  forever:  consumption  is  the  same  for  all
periods  and  states.
The  opportunities  for  legally  protected  overseas  investment  at
the  (certain)  market  interest  rate  and  for  sale  of  c-bonds  at  unbiased
prices  are  all  the  financial  facilities  needed  for  this  plan.
Furthermore,  note  that,  if  the  initial  income,  yi,  is  invested  where  it
4Both types  of enforcement  together  support  the dynamic  smoothing  contracts  that
follow. Bulow  and Rogoff  (1989)  show  that if the former  type alone  is effective,  the
smoothing  strategies  fonnulated  below  do not  work.
28can  be  collateralized  for  the  c-bond  loan  (for  example  in  the  lending
country),  the  default  constraint  is  relaxed  relative  to  the  comparative
static  analysis  above  that  assumed  all  income  was  from  sales  of
c-bonds  and  none  of  the  current  income  in  the  period  in  which
c-bonds  were  introduced  was  saved.  So,  even  if  full  c-bond  coverage
seemed  infeasible  in  that  analysis,  the  above  strategy  may  work.
If  one  ignores  transactions  costs,  as  we  do  here,  a  number  of
different  combinations  of  contracts  could  replicate  the  above
arrangement,  given  the  assumption  of  a  nonbinding  default
constraint.  One  example  is  a  short  forward  contract  plus  a  loan  on  the
anticipated  proceeds  of  the  contract.  Several  commentators  have
suggested  that  a  combination  of  a  futures  contract  and  a  loan  would
also  be  equivalent.  If  the  futures  contract  were  continuously  marked
to  market  as  price  varied  over  the  time  between  commitment  and
maturity,  the  incentive  to  default  would  be  removed  because  losses
from  adhering  to  the  contract  are  paid  out  as  margin  calls  as  they
accrue.  (For  example,  when  the  futures  price  of  a  commodity  rises
by  a  dollar,  the  short  side  pays  a  dollar  per  unit  hedged  to  the
clearing  house.)  And  this  leads  to  additional  uncertain  increases  or
decreases  in  credit  requirements  on  the  part  of  the  hedger.  In
practice  this  can  result  in  serious  complications,  especially  if  trading
is  obstructed  by  price  move  limits  for  significant  periods,  and/or
interest  rates  move  substantially  and  are  not  themselves  hedged.
If  the  default  constraint  binds  on  hedging  with  commodity
bonds  or  forward  contracts,  the  full  smoothing  described  above  is
infeasible.  The  alternative  of  using  futures  markets  is  precluded
because  the  variation  margin  requirements  that  make  default
29unattractive  cannot  be  met  by  a  liquidity-starved  borrower.  Nor  will
the  margin  calls  be  loaned  by  a  third  party  lender  because  of  the
induced  incentive  of  the  borrower  to  default  on  those  loans.
4.2  Default  Constraint  Binding
If  the  default  constraint  binds,  preventing  full  coverage  via  a
simple  commodity  bond,  the  immediate  tr.  sition  to  permanent  full
consumption  smoothing  is  precluded.  What  kinds  of  consumption
smoothing  contracts  are  feasible  in  such  cases?
The  common  type  of  commodity  bond,  (as  reviewed  above),
with  a  call  option  for  the  buyer,  is  clearly  inappropriate  for  this  type
of  smoothing.  True,  the  premium  associated  with  the  option  would
increase  the  lower  consumption  levels  if  the  contract  were  feasible.
But  by  selling  the  call  to  the  lender,  the  borrower  places  herself
under  great  temptation  of  default  when  price  is  high,  and  gets  very
inefficient  low-end  protection.
A  more  promising  strategy  is  to  limit  the  maximum  temptation
for  the  borrower  by  giving  her  some  share  in  the  marginal  gain  from
increases  in  high  prices,  while  limiting  her  maximum  losses.  An
optimal  state-contingent  loan  contract  would  be  ideal.
4.2.1  The  optimal  state-contingent,  no-default  contract
Before  presenting  the  commodity  bond  package,  we  consider  as
a  standard  of  comparison  the  optimal  consumption  plan  for  a  risk-
averse  sovereign  commodity  exporter,  "the  borrower."  Assume  that
the  risk-neutral  lender  must  achieve  non-negative  expected  profits
in  a  long-term  contract  and  that  there  is  free  entry.  The  borrower
30can  repudiate  the  long-term  relationship,  and  will  do  so  whenever
permanent  autarky  is  superior  to  continuation  of  the  consumption-
smoothing  relationship.
The  problem  is  to  maximize
(3)  u(c,)+ E  'u(c,
t-2
with  respect  to  state-contingent  consumption  plans  {c,},,  where
c,-Ct(YI,-- .Yt)L
subject  to  the  no-default  constraint  for  the  borrower
(4)  u(cl)+ EXlJI  u(c+1 i)2  u(y 1)+ EXp'  u(yt+i)  =u(Yt)  +  Eu(y)
i=1  j=~~i1  k)O
for  every  t =  1,2,...,  and  the  profitability  constraint  for  the  lender,
(S)  (y, - c,  ) + E j  P'-' (y, - cJ  )  0 .
t=1
This  is  similar  to  the  problem  of  finding  an  optimal  implicit  long-
term  wage  contract,  as  in  Holmstrom  (1983).  We  can  rewrite  it  as  a
dynamic  programming  problem.  Define  the  history  of  states  as  wt,
where  w,=_(yo,...,y 1 )andw+.  _=(w, yty+).  Let  V,(V,)  represent  the
maximal  surplus  that  the  exporter  gets  at  time  t  from  the
consumption  smoothing  plan  over  permanent  autarky  wheni  the  risk-
neutral  "lender"  receives  profit  V2.  At  time  t  the  lender's  profit  V2  .
31will be a  function of w,, that is V2  *V 2(w,).  The function, V 1(.), is  given
by  the  optimality  equation:
(6)  V1(V,)=max{u (c,)-u  (y,)+DE VI(V 2(w%+ 1))},
with  respect  to  c, and {V 2(wt.  Yt+J)}I,yI
subject  to
(7)  V2t  S (y, -c,) +  PE V2(W,,y  Il),
and
(8)  0  v (V2  (W,, y+))  Y  ,t+J-Yt e{y....,  yS}
and  0 =VAYO)
That  is,  solving  (3)  - (5)  for  the  state-contingent  infinite  horizon
consumption  plan  is  equivalent  to  solving  problem  (6)  at  each  date  t,
in  each  event  wt,  for  c,  and  the  (promised)  profit  to  the  lender  in
each  state  of  nature,  y,+,, for  the  next  period,  by  Bellman's  principal.
A  sufficient  condition  for  a  solution  to  (6)  to  exist  is  that  the  global
endowment  is  bounded  in  each  period  (so  that  c, is  bounded).
Because  u(c)  is  strictly  concave  and  continuously  differentiable,
the  function  V,(V2) can  be  shown  to  be  strictly  concave  and
continuously  differentiable  as  well.  (The  constraints  define  a  convex
choice  set;  with  bounded  global  endowment,  it  is  also  compact.)  We
form  a  Langrangean  for  problem  (6)  and  assigning  the  multiplier
A,(w,)  to  constraint  (7)  and  multipliers  O(w,,y'),...  O(w,,ys)  to  the
constraints  (8),  we  obtain  from  the  first  order  conditions  and
envelope  condition:
32(9)  u'(c,) = (I + 0 (W9Y,++,))  u(c,+1),
(10)  O(w,,y, +,) 2 0 and  +1 V,  (V 2(w,+,))  = O,
for  every  y.+ =Y  y  y
Therefore,  consumption  is  monotonically  increasing  over  time  and
whenever  the  default  constraint  is  not  binding,  in  equilibrium,
(+-=° 0), c, = ct+.  Consumption in period  t +1 will  be  smoothed  across
states  for  which  the  default  constraint  is  not  binding.
To  finish  characterizing  the  optimum  subject  to  potential
repudiation,  we  define  the  minimum  consumption  the  debtor  will
accept in  each  state  in  the optimum.  Define c'  by
VI  (V2)  = u (29)  - u(yi) +f  E  VI  (V2(w,+,)) = 0,
where V2  = yJ  -c  +,6  EV 2(w,+,) and V 1(V2) solves  problem  (6).
We  can  prove the  following:
1  2  3  1  I 2 <c  <c<.<cnd=y
Next, we can calculate cJ using (7) and (8):
0 = u(gs) - U  (yS)  +pE  Vlt+
= u(cS)-u(ys)+  fi  E(u(cs)-u(y4,
because  c  > c,  for  all  j < S;  therefore,  by  (9)  c,+,  =  s  for  every  state
yt+1.
Thus,
33u  (_ )  u  (I)(y'  )+  E (u(y)).
The  solution  for  ci can  be  found  to  be  given  by:
u(Ci) = (1  -P)U(y')+f  [Eiri  u(y')+ u(y')s  7Tj]
i=1  (j  7i=
where  7r  is  the  probability  that  state  i  occurs.
Under  free  entry,  initial  consumption  will  satisfy
(yl -c,)+PfEV2  =0.
we  have  the  following  result:
There  exists  a  state  N  (which  depends  on  al'  of  the  parameters
of  the  problem)  such  that  if  y 1 yN,  then  consumption  is  fully
smoothed  for  all  dates  and  states.  That  is  for  y, Ž yN,  we can  find  c,  to
satisfy
C5  =(1-P)y,  +PEy  (zero profit)
and  c,  Cs
For  y 1 <yN  (if n > 1),  these  cannot  both  be  satisfied,  so  that  we  have  a
state  j  such  that
cl 2c  and c, <  c_+,
for  for 1￿j<S.  Consumption  is  the  same  in  period  2  as  in  period  1 for
all  y  in  period  2  less  than  or  equal  to  yJ.  If  y2 = yi > yj,  then  by  (9)
and  (10),  c2 = c.  Therefore,  c, = c, as  long  as  a  state  exceeding  j  does
not  occur.  Once  a  state  greater  than  yJ  occurs,  consumption
34permanently  rises.  That  is,  c, = c,,  until  some  state  y > yJ  occurs;
thereafter,  c,+,  where  y'=max{y,  ... ,yj,  for  y,+,e{y',...,y'}  for  y,+ =y'
s.st.  l>i.  Whenever  c1 <C'  the  long  run  consumption  is  given  by  cs-
in  the  steady  state  consumption  is  fully  smoothed.  Before  the  steady
state  is  achieved,  consumption  is  smoothed  for  each  date  (t+l)  over
the  set  of  states  {y',... ,y'}  where  y'  is  the  highest  state  realized  before
t+l.  Consumption  is  monotonically increasing  over  time  (weakly).
4.2.2  Implementation  with  one-period  state-contingent  loan
contracts
The  optimum  can  be  achieved  using  one-period  loan  contracts
with  state-contingent  repayment  schedules  under  free  entry  by
competitive,  risk-neutral  lenders.  Suppose  the  loan  contract  specifies
an  amount  I,  and  repayment  schedule  R,(y,+,) for  period t+1.
The  zero  expected  profit  condition  is
-1t  +,  E R,(y,+ 1 ) =  °
Returning  to  problem  (6):
V,  (V2t)  = max  {u (c,)  - u (yt)  F  P E V  (V2+')}
(11)  ~~~s.t.  Yt  -c  +P EV2+'  = V2t
Define
35Rt  ,(yI)  =  V2
R,(y,+,)=  V2"  V2(W1Y1+,)
and 1, =c  +V2 -y
Then  the  constraint  (11)  satisfied  by  the  solution  to  (6)  assures  that
-it + 13  E(R, (y,+,))  = 0,
and  V 2(yO)  = O=  -11  + P E(R (y2))  = °
for  the  initial  loan.  Therefore,  a  sequence  of  one-period  state-
contingent  contracts  suffice  to  attain  the  optimal  plan,  as  Worrall
(1989)  has  shown.
Next,  we  note  that  because  consumption  is  completely
smoothed  for  all  states,  y,  less  than  or  equal  to  the  historical
maximum  or  state  j  (defined  above)  whichever  is  greater,  we  have
c,+r constant  for all  i  s.t.  y  rnmax{yj,y 1,...,y,j=y,.  This  implies that  for
all y,+,i5y,, the  optimum  state-contingent  loan  contract  (1-period)  has
repayments  R,(yt+ 1) s.t.  y,+l-Rt(yt+ 1)=  constant.  For  states
Yt+l  > Yt' (yt+l  - R(yt+))  -*ll, in  general,  vary  with  y,+,.  The  new  loan
contract,  (lt+ 1,R,+ 1(yt+ 2)),  will  remain  the  same  as  last  period  for  all
y,+, ￿  ,  but  will  change  for  y,  > 9y.
4.2.3  Smoothing  with  commodity  bonds
We  now  show  that  a  commodity  bond  constructed  as  a  package
of  a  one-period  loan  and  a  put  option  for  the  exporter  can  achieve
feasible  smoothing.  Indeed  it  results  in  a  pattern  of  smoothing
similar  to  that  seen  in  the  more  complex  optimal  state-contingent
loan  contract  discussed  above.  The  commodity  bond  contract  never
36dominates  the  fully  state  contingent  contract  in  our  model.  But  it  has
the  offsetting  advantage  of  simplicity,  and  the  associated  potential
for  more  liquid  trading  as  a  relatively  standardized  instrument.
The  1-period  put  option  on  the  commodity  has  strike  value  y,.
The  exporter  exercises  the  put  if  y,  y,,  receiving  income  y,*.  The
option  premium,  z,,  is  given by  the zero profit  condition:
z, = E(max{y,  - y, o}).
This  must  be  paid  in  every  state.  We  let  it  be  paid  at  date  t,  the
same  date  that  the  put  is  exercised  or  expires.  Therefore,  the
exporter  gets  from  this  option  the  net  income:
max{y, ,y,}  - 4z.
If  the  put  is  exercised  (i.e. yt  ￿  y.),  then  assume  that  the  same  put
option is  contracted  for  the  next  period.  If  y,  > yt  then  a  new  put  is
chosen  with  higher  strike  value  y,.,.
Now,  let  the  exporter  also  have  access  to  a  loan  market  with
standard  non-state-contingent  bonds  (one-period).  The  penalty  for
non-repayment  is  removal  of  all  opportunities  for  smoothing  in  the
future,  whether  by  borrowing  or  via  options.  In  period  t,  she  chooses
an  option  contract  with  strike  value  y,.,  for  the  next  period  and  a
loan  lt  (positive  or  negative).  The  repayment  due  at  t+1  is  UP1 ,  so
that  her  consumption  at  t+l  is
Ct+1  =[Max(y,+,  , y +) - z, -1, /  1]  + 1+,
37To  find  the  equilibrium  path  in  c-bonds,  define  the  state
variable:
Bt = Max(y,.  y,) - Z" - l,/}
At  time  t,  the  exporter  chooses It and y,.
The  equilibrium  problem  is  the  same  as  the  dynamic
prograrnming  problem:
Vq(Bt) = Max{u(Bt+lt)-u(yt)+PEkVk(Bt+l)) with respect to (It. y+ 1)
such  that:
Bt+,  = Max(y,+,,  yt  ) - -t  z,  It
and
Vk(Bi+,) 2 0,  Vk
where  subscripts  q  and  k  indicate  realized  states  yq and yk.
The  first  order  conditions  imply
U(ct) = E[Vk'(B,+l).(I  +  k)]
and
E[Vk'(B,+,).(l  + Ok)] = E[Vk'(Bt+I). (I + Ok) IYt+ 1￿  Y.+1J
wher^  *k  is  the  multiplier  for  the  constraint  Vk(Bt+l)O,
k.Vk(B)  =  . Ok  2
0O
38If  y,  ￿  y,  then Bt+i  is  constant.  For  each  state  y,+ 1 ly;,  the  borrower
chooses  the  same consumption  by  choosing  the  same  It+j.  Therefore,
for states less then or equal to y: the  state-contingent pattern  of  net
income  is  similar  to  that  of  the  optimal  one-period  state-contingent
loan  contract.
However,  for  y,+.>y,  "net income" B is  [y t +i-  -1,IP1,  so that  B
increases  with  Yt+l one for  one, and
Vk'(Bt+l)  = u'(B,+,  + 1,+,)  = u'(c,+,(k)).
This  is  not  necessarily  true  for  the  optimal  one-period  state-
contingent  loan  contracts;  net  income  for  them is  given  by
[y,+, - Rt(yt+,  )].
From  the  first  order  conditions,
u'(c) > u'(c,+,)  for Yt+,  s Yt+,
and  k=0  for  k<n where
n=Max(k: yk  y, 1 )+,
For  yk<yn,  consumption  ct+l is  monotone increasing  in  yt+ 1 .
How  does  the  put  option  cum  non-contingent  bond  scheme
work?  Start  off  with  yl; the  exporter  takes  an  initial  loan  11 and
consumes  cl  =yl+ll  at  t=1  and contracts  for  a  put  option  with  strike
income  y;  and  premium
39z  = E[Max(y  - y.O)}.
Next period, if  Y 2 sY  Y
C2 (y  z  /P)+1
y; is  chosen  such  that  in  equilibrium  the  exporter  does  not
default in any states at  t=2, given 11, and C2=cl if y2 Sy;.  If  y;<ys,  then
there  is  some  state  such  that  if  Y2 equals  this  state  the  exporter  is
just  indifferent  between  being  able  to  continue  smoothing  her
consumption  and  permanent  autarky.  Choosing  a  higher  strike
income  than  yj  to  obtain  more  insurance  for  period  2  to  insure
compliance  by  the  exporter  lowers  first  period  consumption.  There
is  a  trade-off  between  smoothing  across  states  of  nature  at  t=2  and
between  dates  one  and  two.
If  y2:gy;, the  exporter  just  repeats  her  choice  of  contract,
choosing  the  same  put  option  and  non-contingent  loan  repayment
(11/IP) for  period  3.  But  in  the  first  period  t  in  which  yt  exceeds  y;,
her  choice  of  strike  income  rises  to  a  level  sufficient  to  smooth  her
consumption in  the  following  period for  all  y,+ 1:y,.  Her choice of loan
also  changes.  The  new  put  is  exercised  for  all  Yt+,  s y,  and  the
borrower  chooses  a  new  loan  to  make  ctas  large  as  possible  without
causing her  to choose to  default in  any state  in  the  next period,  t+l.
The  strike  income  rises  each  time  a  new  historical  high  occurs.
Once  the  highest  state  yS occurs,  consumption  is  smoothed  across  all
states  and  remains  constant  thereafter.  The  steady  state




To  avoid  default  in  the  steady  state,  c*  must  be  at  least  as  great  as
CS.  This  implies  an  upper  bound  on  1*.  For  some  sets  of  parameters
of  the  model,  cS>ey  so  that  1* must  be  negative.  The  exporter  will
have  to  invest  some  of  her  current  resources  externally  and  use  the
interest  to  augment  the  feasible  smoothed  consumption  level  c'  so
that  c  2 cg.  (Since  domestic  investment  is  ruled  out  by  assumption
here,  the  investment  must  be  external.  We  assume  it  is  subject  to
seizure  by  creditors  in  the  event  of  default.)
cl=yl+l*<yl,
so if yl is low, say yl=yI,  then cl is  strictly less than c*.
If  the  initial  state,  y1,  is  low,  full  insurance  might  not  be
possible  immediately.  To  achieve  a  high  enough  level  of  smoothed
income  in  the  next  period  to  preclude  repudiation  in  a  high  state,  the
initial  loan  must  satisfy  ey+1(1-1/B)=cS.  Therefore  first  period
consumption  is  c, = y, + l  which  can  be  much  lower  than  c*.  (For
example  let  y, = y'.)  Thus  full  smoothing  at  a  certain,  constant  level
of  c  for  all  future  periods  cannot  be  achieved  immediately  in  all
cases.  Furthermore,  feasible  full  smoothing  after  a  one  period  delay
is  less  desirable  for  the  exporter  than  a  program  with  a  higher  initial
loan  and  initial  consumption,  but  no  guarantee  of  full  smoothing  next
period  in  all  states.
41In  general,  there  is  a  dynamic  tradeoff  between  the  current
consumption  level  and  the  amount  of  insurance  coverage  for  the  next
period.  The  consumption  floor  ratchets  upward  whenever  a  new
historically  highest  state  is  first  visited,  until  full  smoothing  is
achieved.
Thus  this  scheme,  using  only  1-period  bonds  and  put  options,
exhibits  the  type  of  monotonically  rising  consumption  floor  seen  in
the  pattern  of  smoothing  generated  by  the  first-best  long-term
contract.  Note  that  cs is  the  same  in  the  first-best  as  here,  but
ci, Vj<S,  is  in  general  different  from  the  first  best.  Steady  state
consumption  is  c  Ž cS.
The  constrained  first-best  path  and  the  put-cum-bond  path  are
the  same  if  initial  income  is  high  enough  to  allow  immediate
complete  smoothing  at  c' > S,  or  if  there  is  only  one realization  of  y,
yS,  that  is  above  the  minimum  strike  income  chosen  when  yl=y 1.
The  paths  differ  in  other  cases  because  the  put-cum-bond  scheme  is
not  fully  state-contingent  for  realizations  of  y  above  the  strike
income.  The  only  way  to  alter  the  differential  between  the
consumptions  associated  with  two  such  states  in  t+1  is  by  varying
t+l,  but  that  affects  the  relation  between ct+l  and ct+2.  There are too
few  instruments  to  replicate  the  constrained  first-best  path  in  such
cases.
The  non-contingent  bond  and  the  option  premium  are  repaid  in
the  same  amount  in  every  state.  For  states  below  the  strike  income
this  is  not  a  problem  as  all  income  variation  between  such  states  is
removed  by  the  option.  If  there  are  multiple  higher  states  the
contracts  are  incomplete  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  allow  for
42state-contingent  repayments  as  in  the  more  complex  first-best
contractual  design,  when  initial  income is  low.  Though  the  smoothing
behavior  under  the  two  types  of  contracts  is  qualitatively  similar  in
such  cases,  with  a  minimum  consumption  level  that  ratchets  up  till  it
achieves  a  constant  level,  there  is  a  difference in  the  efficiency  of  the
smoothing  achieved.
5.  Conclusions
Consumption  smoothing  contracts  might  in  principle  be  quite
valuable  to  many  countries  heavily  dependent  on  an  export
commodity  subject  to  price  risk.  It  is  frequently  said  that  futures
coverage  could  be  useful in  this  role  if  they had  longer  maturities.  In
this  paper  we  have  shown  that  substantial  long-term  protection  can
be  achieved  by  rolling  over  one-period  futures.  The  marginal  net
benefits  of  lengthening  the  horizon  beyond  one  production  period
(roughly  what  is  observed  in  practice)  depend  upon  transactions  cost,
the  degree  of  serial  correlation,  and  the  discount  factor.  In  practice,
the  extra  benefits  of  a  substantially  longer  hedging  horizon  may
often  be  rather  small.
If  production  responds  to  incentives  with  a  one-period  lag,  the
rollover  strategy  does  not  provide  perfect  protection  at  the  time  the
hedge  is  made.  This  is  true  even  if  production  response  to  inputs  is
non-stochastic,  in  contrast  to  the  case  of  one-period  hedging.
In  cases  where  a  sovereign  exporter  can  offer  no  collateral,  and
is  short  of  liquid  resources,  the  use  of  futures  is  precluded  by  the
need  to  furnish  the  margins  that  guard  against  default.  Standard
loans  and  buffer  funds  have  the  disadvantage  that  they  will  with
43probability  one  reach  crisis  states  in  which  the  resolution  of  the  crisis
is  ill-defined;  recognition  of  this  by  lenders  no  doubt  dampens  their
enthusiasm  somewhat.
In  this  context  commodity  bonds  with  a  put  for  the  seller
(borrower-exporter)  offer  at  least  part  of  the  benefits  of  using  fully
state-contingent  contrac-ts  constrained  only  by  sovereign  immunity.
In  fact  when  initial  conditions  are  sufficiently  good  the  two  are
identical.  A  straight  commodity  bond  suffices  for  fully  smoothing
consumption.  When  the  initial  state  is  bad,  commodity  bonds
combining  a  put  and  a  loan  for  the  exporter  can  achieve  some  degree
of  consumption  smoothing  in  the  face  of  random  export  prices  for
commodity-dependent  countries  that  cannot  offer  credible  collateral
for  foreign  loans.  Consumption  is  nondecreasing  over  time  and
becomes  fully  smoothed  if  and  when  the  highest  income  state  is
visited.
Though  put-cum-loan  bond  contracts  do  not  in  general  achieve
a  constrained  efficient  consumption  path,  they  have  the  significant
practical  advantage  of  comprising  two  similar  and  simple
instruments,  a  conventional  loan  and  a  put  option.  Any  additional
state  contingencies  needed  for  a  constrained  efficient  contract  will  be
country-specific.  The  put  options,  on  the  other  hand,  could  in
principle  be  used  by  multiple  countries  as  appropriate,  and  therefore
are  more  likely  to  have  a  liquid  market  and  therefore  lower
transaction  costs.  Likewise,  in  equilibrium  the  bonds  are  always
repaid  in  full;  there  is  no  prospect  of  costly  loan  renegotiations.  This
commodity  bond,  constructed  as  a  conventional  loan  with  fixed
repayment  obligation  and  an  attached  put  for  the  seller,  contrasts
44with  commonly  observed  commodity  bond  contracts,  which  generally
attach  a  call  option  for  the  buyer  to  the  loan.  The  consumption-
smoothing  achieved  reduces  downside  exposure  of  the  seller,  while
leaving  her  a  sufficiently  large  share  of  high  realizations  that  she  is
not  tempted  to  default.
Though  we  have  shown  this  only  in  the  case  of  pure  price
uncertainty  with  i.i.d.  disturbances  (and,  hence,  no  interperiod
storage),  availability  of  a  constant  risk-free  rate  of  return  and
market  risk  neutrality  of  lenders,  our  results  suggest  further
investigation  of  the  smoothing  possibilities  of  these  instruments  in
more  general  circumstances.  Drawing  on  our  results  for  futures
rollovers,  we  infer  that  in  the  presence  of  serial  correlation  of  of  the
disturbance,  commodity  bond  "rollovers"  will  not  in  practice  be  used
to  eliminate  all  consumption  variations  over  multiple  periods.
45Table  1  Commodity  price instability,  1950-1986
Coefficient  of variation,  percentages
Commodity  1950-69  1970-86
5-yr  price  5-yr  price
MA  change  MA  change
Cocoa  21  25  22  28
Coffee  12  16  24  35
Tea  7  11  19  23
Sugar  35  39  38  47
Cotton  6  13  13  19
Jute  20  22  12  18
Rubber  16  24  18  23
Source:  Newbery  (1990,  Table  5.1)
Notes: Price  change  is the  standard  deviation  of 2 Pt-  p-)  / (p, + p, ,.
5-year  MA is the CV of deviations  frm  the S-year  moving  average.
46Table 2  Squared  coefficient  of variation of prices,  19501986
perventages
Commonacdity  1950-69  1970-86
5-yr  price  5-yr  price
MA  change  MA  change
Cocoa  4.4  6.3  4.4  7.8
coffee  1.4  2.6  5.8  12.3
Tea  .05  1.2  3.6  5.3
Sugar  12.3  15.2  14.4  22.1
Cotton  0.4  1.7  1.7  3.6
Jute  4.0  4.8  1.4  3.2
Rubber  2.6  5.8  3.2  5.3
Source:  Table  1
47Table 3  Effects  of stabilizing  copper  and coffee  pricer. !961-1986
percentages
Coefficients  of variation
Average  Revenue  Revenue  Exports  Exports
export  share  unstabilized  stabilized  unstabilized  stabilized
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Copper
aCile  S0  18  17  12  8
Zaire  39  16  16  31  24
Zambia  88  18  16  18  12
Papua  New  20  33  13  14  13
Guinea
Coffee
Bazil  22  22  22  17  16
Colombia  43  19  15  10  10
Source:  World  Bank  data
Notes:  (1)  is avege  share  of exports  in total  export  revenue
(2)  is the CV of deviations  from 5-yr  MA  export  revenue
(3)  is the CV of deviations  from 5-yr  export  revenue  valuing  the
exports  at prices  stabilized  at their  5-yr  MA level
(4)  is the CV of deviations  from 5-yr  MA total  export  revenue
(5)  is the CV of deviations  from 5-yr  MA total export  revenue valuing
the  exports  at  prices  stabilized  at their  5-yr  MA level
All export revenues were deflated by the Index of Manufacturing  Unit Value
VMUV).
48Table 4  Persistence of price shocks, 1900-1987
Commodity  Persistence  Longest  Lag years
Autocoar  Deaton
measure  PER20
Rice  0.11  0.18  9
Palmoil  0.13  0.13  5
Coffee  0.38  0.17  11
Bananas  0.45  0.59  10
Wheat  0.46  0.24  10
Sugar  0.52  0.11  6
Cocoa  0.65  0.29  2
Tea  0.72  0.37  2
Beef  1.0  0
Maize  1.1  0.19  10
Lamb  1.30  4
Average  0.61  6.28
lmber  0.1  8
wool  0.35  2
Jute  0.4  0.19  5
Hides  0.43  2
Cotton  0.67  0.39  3
Tobacco  0.73  4
Rubber  1.0  0
Average  0.51  3.43
oil  0.51  11
Silver  0.65  8
Tm  0.65  0.43  c
Lead  0.73  3
Aluminium  0.93  5
Zinc  1.0  0
Copper  1.0  0.31  0
Coal  1.0  0
Average  0.81  4.0
Source:  Cuddington  and Urzda  (1987),  Deaton  and Laroque  (1989,  Table  2)
Notes:  Annual data. The first measure  is the sum of the statistically  significant
autocorrelation  coefficients,  as calculated  by Cuddington  and Urzia and
explained in the text.  Deaton and Laroque's measure of persistence is
PER20, given in from Table 5 below, and explained  therein. The longest
lag is the highest  order  stadsdcally  significant  lag.
49Table S  Variability and persistence of annual commodity prices, 1900-1987
Coinmodity  CV  ARI  AR2  PER20  PER40
Bananas  0.17  0.91  0.82  0.59  0.52
Cocoa  0.54  0.83  0.66  0.29  0.24
Coffee  0.45  0.80  0.62  0.17  0.11
Copper  0.38  0.84  0.64  0.31  0.22
Cotton  0.35  0.88  0.68  0.39  0.13
Jute  0.33  0.71  0.45  0.19  0.09
Maize  0.38  0.76  0.53  0.19  0.10
Palmoil  0.48  0.73  0.48  0.13  0.05
Rice  0.36  0.83  0.61  0.18  0.08
Sugar  0.60  0.62  0.39  0.11  0.06
Tea  0.26  0.78  0.59  0.37  0.28
TMI  0.42  0.90  0.76  0.43  0.18
Wheat  - 0.38  0.86  0.68  0.24  0.11
Source:  Deaton  and Laroque  (1989,  Table  2).
Notes:  CV is the coefficient  of variation. ARI and AR2 are the first and second
order autocorrelation  coefficients  of the deflated series of prices. PER20
and PER40 are the Cainpbell/Mankiw-Cochrane  measures  of persistence
with window  widths  of 20 and 40 years.
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54APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF RISK FORMULAS
The  cost  of  income  risk
If  c  is  consumption,  a  random  variable  with  mean  c, CVo,, and U(c), is
utility,  then  the  cost  of  risk,  is  defined  by  the  equation
U(c-p)=EU(c).  Expand both sides  in  a  second-order Taylor  series:
U(cd)-pU'(Z5)-U(c)  + 2 Var(c)U"(c),
2
or qIU  /  Rr2,  where  R- =cU"(c)/U'(c). 2
Hedging  with  risky  prices
Producers  choose  inputs  at  the  start  of  the  year,  to  produce  output,  q.
There  is  no  uncertainty  about  output,  but  prices  are  risky  and  not
yet  known  when  inputs  are  chosen.  The  futures  price  is,  however,
known,  and  the  producer  can  choose  a  hedge  at  the  same  time  as  the
choice  of  inputs,  so  that  the  futures  price  is  the  action  certainty
equivalent  price,  i.e.  the  price  which  would  induce  the  same  actions,
in  this  case  the  choice  of  inputs,  as  a  perfectly certain  output price  of
the  same  level.  The  price  at  harvest  is  f +  u,  where  u  is  a  mean-
zero  random  variable,  and  f  is  the  expected  value  of  p  (and  also  the
futures  price  if  there  is  an  unbiased  futures  market).  The  producer's
income  (in  the  absence  of  a  futures  market)  is
1  2 (1)  y=pq_  - cq
55and  the  producer  has  a  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  utility
function.  Assuming  p  is  normally  distributed  (or  under  weaker
assumptions,  given  in  Newbery,  1988,  to  a  high  degree  of
approximation), he  chooses q  to  maximize
(2)  U=Eg-.2AVar(y).
This can be  written
(3)  U=pq-  (cq-Ap2q  2)
where  A  is  the  coefficient  of  absolute  risk  aversion,  and  ap is the CV
of price, SD(G)/p.  The optimal choice of q is given by
(4)  q=  =1,  0=1+2Rac;  R=
co  2c
Here R  is  the  (dimensionless) coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion,
evaluated  at  the  risk-free  level  of  income,  y = . p2/c.  The  certainty
equivalent level of income is then U=  pI/(c#). 2
Perfect price  stabilization
The effect of perfectly stabilizing price is  to set ap = 0,  and to change
the value of * to  1.  The  cash  value  of  stabilization  to  the  farmer  is
measured  by  the  change  in  certainty  equivalent  income,  AU:
(S)  AU  1= 2RaPU
56If  the  farmer has  access to  an  unbiased futures market with price  f,
then  income  must be  augmented by  the term  z(f  -p),  where z  is the
volume of  futures sold.  Substituting this term in (2)  and choosing z
optimally (see  e.g Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p184), shows that z  =
q,  and the effect on (3) is  to eliminate the term with A.  The benefit
of introducing the futures market will be  the same as  (5).
Price stabilization when prices are  autocorrelated
Suppose prices follow the following simple autoregressive scheme:
(6)  Pt  = a P,  +(l-a)p+u,,
whereU, is i.i.d. with zero mean.  This can also be written as
Again, f  is  the expected price, equal to  the futures price at  the  start
of  period  t  in  an  unbiased market.  The same  arguments as  before
imply that in the absence of  a futures market:
f  f (7)  q=  f,U=2fp,  0=(1+2Re,). CO  ~2c#'
where  the  time  subscript  has  been  suppressed.  Now  consider  the
problem  facing  a  farmer  with  a  two-year horizon,  with  the  initial
expected price  f,=p,  its  long-run average level.  This in  turn  implies
that  p,=p(l+!j,  where  E,=U,/p,  and  ?+,= (l+ae,.  Consider  the
57present  value  of  the  two  certainty  equivalent  incomes  at  the  end  of
period  t:
(8)  W= f%2+  =2  [I  +P (I+ag?)]. 2c0  2cQ  2c0
where  ,B is  the  discount  factor,  and  0=1+2RcT2.  Each  term  in  (8)  is
the  certainty  equivalent  income  for  that  period,  but  at  the  start  of
period  t,  the  certainty  equivalent  income  in  period  t +1  is  uncertain.
The  certainty  equivalent  present  value  can  be  found  by  replacing  y
by W in (2) and is
(9)  V=  {1+(1+a2c:)-R3 2 ax2  (2+a2a),0}
The  effect  of  having  an  unbiased  futures  market  and  allowing  one-
period  ahead  hedging is  to set  0 = I  in equations  (8)  and  (9).  If  a >0,
there  is  no  simple  analytical  expression  for  the  proportional  gain  in
certainty  equivalent  income  in  introducing  a  futures  market,  but
suppose  1=0.9,  a2=0.1, R=1,  then  the  benefits  of  a  futures  market
fall  with  a  and are only 85% as large at  a =I as a=0.
Even  if  the  futures  market  only  extends  one  period  ahead,  it  is
possible  to  increase  the  degree  of  hedging  by  rolling  over  contracts
as  they  mature.  Consider  the  strategy  of  selling  (p/c)(l+,Bz)  futures
at  the  start  of  period  t,  and  find  the  optimal  value  of  z.  The  present
value at the  end  of  period t  is:
(10)  W=2C{lI+P(l+ae,)+2pz  (Lp)}.
58The  choice  of  z  is  that  which  minimizes  the  certainty  equivalent
value  of  W,  which  in  this  case  amounts  to  minimizing  the  variance  of
W.  The solution is  z=a,  and  this  gives,  ignoring  terms  is  ap  higher
than  UP:
-2 (1 1)  V  = 2P  {1+p8(+a2cr<)}.
It  is  -immediate  that  this  strategy  of  sequential  futures  trading
reduces  risk  further  than  futures  trading  confined  to  each  year.
Extensions to  n-year  rolling  hedge
Choose  units  so  that  p =1= c,  and  suppose  that  fe  =1.  (This  last
assumption  is  not  innocuous,  but  can  be  relaxed,  and  does  not  alter
the  thrust  of  the  argument.)  The  level  of  output  when  the  expected
price  is  at  its  long-run average  level of  1 is  also  1, and  suppose that a
single  futures contract  is  also  for  this  amount.  Then
(12)  f1=1+a'eO+..aej.l,  i21,  fj-p=-e-
Consider  the  risk-minimizing  n-period  hedge  constructed  by  selling  a
number  of  hedges  n, at  the  start of period i:
(13)  n, =f, [l+ a,B+... (a.8)  ni+1]
This  can  be  thought  of  as  follows.  The  first  term  hedges  planned
output  in  period  i,  which,  given  the  normalizations,  is  equal  to  the
certainty  equivalent  price,  fi.  The  remaining terms cover  the costs  of
59rolling  forward the  hedge  next period.  At  the end  of each  period,
current income will be
f,2 _-(n,  -1) e" 
2
where the first  term  is  the  profit from  the  perfectly hedged current
output,  and  the  second term  is  the  net  income from  liquidating the
remaining  (n,-I)  he(Iges.  Now  consider  the  NPV  of  income
discounted to  the end of period 0  (i.e to  the date of  settling period-O
hedges):
+.82"  f12  +  "lf.  +  )
-f  eO[ab+..(a b)r']  -P  f,e,(nl  -1)-..
where the tildes over the fs  are a  reminder that future futures prices
are  uncertain.  If  we  are  looking  for  the  variance-minimizing
strategy, and  if  we ignore terms smaller than  VP,  and if  we examine
the  i-th  term  in  this  expression,  then  we  need  to  evaluate  typical
terms such as
tpl  f*2 -Pejfi(a,P+..+(aPr-i-'1).
The  variance  will  involve  taking  the  expected  values  of  squared
terms,  bearing in  mind that  as  the  es  are i.i.d.  that Eeie=Ofori*j.
Ignoring higher order terms, this will involve terms such as
,  (a'e  +- *+ aej,-6) - p0(ni  - I)
60Collecting terms together and substituting for  f, gives
(14)  ip  i fai 1-i  - Ciz(ap)t
1.0  jet  k-Il
which shows that  if  the world came to  an  end after  n  periods, then
an  n-period rollover hedge would eliminate risk.  In the general case
the  terms left  uncancelled are
(15)  a  {£  e.J}
and  the  practical  question  is  by  how  much  an  n-period  rollover
reduces risk  compared to  an  (n-i)-period  hedge, and  what  this  risk
reduction is  worth to the producer, and what it might cost in terms of
additional numbers of  hedges to  finance.  The  reduction in  variance
in  increasing the  period of hedging by  I  (and the number of  hedges
by  (ape-1))  is
(16)  p2a42a2Jc9  P2a.2{1a; 2 }O2
The  value  of  this  reduction  in  risk  is  R  times  this  reduction  in
variance  (which, by  cormalization, is  also  the  CV  squared), and  if
each extra futures contract costs p,  the marginal benefit per  unit cost
is
IpA-  _ ab"-2Rv2
(Pa)  i  a2  Ja  U
61Clearly,  as  the  time  horizon  of  the  hedge  increases,  the  marginal
benefit  also  falls.
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Stabilising  Zambia's copper  price
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64Figure  3
Stabilizing Brazil's coffee price
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Stabilizing Brazil's coffee price
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6#,Figure  5
Stabilizing Colombia's coffee price
exports at constant  value
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67Figure  6
Stabilizing Colombia's coffee price
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